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Fallacies and illogics generated and dispersed by professionals, big businesses and tech-media

(1) Unknown Nature of Biometrics    (2) Overlooked Security in Cyberspace    (3) Ignored Nature of Humans’ Identity

1.   Unknown Nature of Biometrics

It is getting known that NIST no longer allows biometrics to be used on its own but requires it to be used ‘only as part of multi-factor authentication with a physical authenticator (something you have)’ in view of the inherent vulnerabilities of biometrics as stated in 5.2.3 ‘Use of Biometrics’ of Digital Identity Guidelines 800-63B.

Privacy issues of biometrics are relatively well known. Not a few people are aware that it will be catastrophic when biometrics data are leaked, since it is impossible to change or cancel biometrics data. (‘when’ rather than ‘if’ in view of the long lists of data breach by sophisticated attacks.)

But the security aspect of biometrics brought by the co-use with a fallback password is unknown. It is probably due to the indifference of the participants to those facts as quoted below.

FAR, FRR & Threshold explained with graphs
- False Acceptance Rates and False Rejection Rates are in a trade-off relation, not independent from each other

False acceptance of 1/1,000,000 is not necessarily better than that of 1/50,000 in biometrics
- We need to know the corresponding false rejection rates before judgment.

‘Unique’ is not ‘Secret’
- Identification is not authentication. Convenience is not security.

Cinderella challenged by foot recognition (Published 2005)
- False Rejection vs False Acceptance

NIST requires that biometrics “SHALL be used only with a physical authenticator” (NIST 800-63B 5.2.3)

Turn off biometrics where security matters
- Biometrics is a good tool to achieve a good convenience, not a good security.


2.   Overlooked Security in Cyberspace

The security we need is for safer life of good citizens. We do not need such security measures that help criminals and tyrants.

Password-less Life -  It is a Dystopia.
- What we need is a new breed of password to succeed the conventional password.

Two entrances placed in parallel provide nice convenience to criminals
- This is what we witness in so many biometrics products in cyberspace

Behind the unsuccessful password guidelines are security experts’ indifference to humans’ cognition

The password written on a memo is ‘‘what we have’, not ‘what we know’


3.   Ignored Nature of Humans’ Identity

Having our identity authenticated is for social activities in human communities, in which our identity is not separated from our volition and personal memories.

Volition & Memory
- Shall we discuss our ‘identity as citizens living in society’ rather than that of ‘a chunk of bone, flesh, fat and skin’?

What is expected of a successor to the password?
- What has to be used with a password is not qualified. 

We could be more rational in defining our identity as a citizen in human society
- Our autobiographic memory, not our body features, makes our identity as a citizen

Smartphone Security – Intuitive, easy and reliable
- We could make use of autobiographic/episodic memory

Identity Assurance in Emergency
- Episodic memories enable intuitive authentication that stands panicky situations

Amazing Security Comics (Published 2005)
- Homo sapiens versus NIST-backed security professionals


Appendix – Related articles published on Media

Unnecessary Deaths Presumably Brought By Faulty Biometrics

Biometrics as additional access route weaker than password-only protection

Make sure not to mix up ‘Identification’ with ‘Authentication’

Mitigation of Password Predicament

Virtual Strategy Magazine - Intuitive Passwords: Passwords to Succeed Passwords


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