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< Update - History, Current Status and Future Scenarios of Expanded Password System >

The concept of Expanded Password System first came up in 2000. It was followed by the prototyping in 2001 and the commercial implementations from 2003. Over the period of 2003 to 2008, the business was successful, with commercial adoptions amounting to over US$1 million.

It then ceased to grow as people were more and more carried away by the myths of biometrics and ‘password-less’ authentication which the advocates alleged would kill the passwords altogether. We knew that their allegations were false but people would not listen to our small voice. We opted to get out of Japan where biometrics people were overwhelmingly dominant.

Now, we have not a few friends and supporters globally.  In 2019 we saw the publication of our article by Taylor & Francis and the selection of our proposition as a finalist for “FDATA Global Open Finance Summit & Awards 2019”.

We will be able to come up with the commercial products for the global market just easily and quickly with a relatively small budget because the practicability-proven algorithms are already here.

Click the link for the full text.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/update-history-current-status-future-scenarios-expanded-kokumai/



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