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Update – Q&A


The following questions are answered in this update.

-What do we think makes ‘what we are’?
-Does it make sense to compare different authenticators?
-Are you sure that the password is easy to crack?
-How different is ‘hard-to-forget’ from ‘easy-to-remember’?
-What impact the computing power has on the processing of secret credentials?
-What are ‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’ conditions for reliable identity assurance?
-Does a solid theory warrant a solid implementation?
-What role cryptography plays for Expanded Password System?
-What is ‘on-the-fly’ key regeneration?
-Is Expanded Password System complementary to FIDO2?

-What can ‘probabilistic authenticators’ achieve in cyberspace?
-How different is ‘Another Layer’ from ‘Another Entrance’?
-Is a default password different from a fallback password?
-Why so many people do not hesitate to sacrifice privacy for decreased security?
-What are correct use cases of biometrics?

-Why is UK adopted as the venue for the global headquarters?
-Who adopted Expanded Password System for what?

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/update-questions-answers-expanded-password-system-related-kokumai/


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