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Probabilistic Is Human Body, Not Pattern-Matching Algorithm


The probabilistic nature of biometrics comes from the unpredictably variable body features of living animals rather than imperfect algorithms of pattern matching; perfection of pattern matching algorithm would not affect the probabilistic nature of biometrics.

Biometrics that measures the probabilistic body features does not escape False Rejection/False Non-Match/False Negative that inevitably comes with False Acceptance/False Match/False Positive. 

Since it cannot escape FR/FNM/FN, biometrics cannot escape the dependence on a fallback measure, a default password/pincode in most cases, which brings the security to the level lower than a password/pincode-only authentication.

And yet, so many people who need higher security are spending so much money for bringing security down.



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