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Biometrics - Spoofing and Liveness Detection


Last November I examined the issue of spoofing and liveness detection from the view point of the trade-off between False Acceptance/False Match (FA/FM) and False Rejection/False Non-Match (FR/FNM). I bring it back in view of the yet bigger noises around fruitless arguments.

Below is the conclusion.

Spoofing is another factor to raise FA/FM rates and Liveness Detection is another factor to raise FR/FNM rates; the presence of FR/FNM forcing the users to rely on a fallback measure, a default password/pincode in most cases, which brings down the overall security to the level lower than the authentication by a default password/pincode alone.

That’s all.



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