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Biometrics Used Correctly


Anything used correctly is useful and so are UV, disinfectant and biometrics.

Identification in physical space of personnel at critical facilities could be a correct use of biometrics. Another correct use is detection of suspicious guys who try to take over the logged-in device while the user is away. Behavioral biometrics could help here; suspicious behavior detected, the guy handling the device would be asked to feed a password for fresh login.

If the biometrics used in cyber space are explicitly declared to bring down security in return for increased convenience, it would be a correct use case.  On the other hand, it is definitely wrong and unethical to declare that biometrics used with a default/fallback password/PIN will increases security. 

Mixing up the security-lowering 'multi-entrance' deployment of two factors with the security-enhancing 'multi-layer' deployment would bring a serious false sense of security that is worse than a lack of security.  Proponents of biometrics are expected to behave as such.
Click the link for this and many other discussions
https://www.valuewalk.com/2020/05/digital-identity-biometrics-use/


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