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What makes ‘what we are’?


It has long been asserted that there are three components for identity authentication – ‘What We Remember’ (Secret Credential), ‘What We Have’ (Tokens) and ‘What We Are ‘(Body Features).

Feeding a correct secret credential is under our control.  So is presenting a correct token to some extent. But our body features are just beyond our control.  Wouldn’t it be more appropriate to call it ‘What Our Body Features Are’?

What we remember’ and ‘What we have’, which are both deterministic, can be used together in a security-enhancing ‘two-layer’ deployment, whereas probabilistic ‘what our body features are’ can actually be used with another factor only in a security-lowering ‘two-entrance’ deployment.

We practically have two factors of ‘what we remember’ and ‘what we have’ as valid authenticators, with ‘what our body features are’ counted in cyberspace as an optional tool to increase convenience at the sacrifice of security.

It might sound a bit outrageous to the old school who have asserted that ‘what we are’ is made of our body features. But we are confident that the public will agree with us at the end of the day.

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